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3.1  Introduction 
The tax  systems of  industrialized countries are changing rapidly  and, in 
some cases, are undergoing major reforms.  The ongoing tax reform in Japan 
is part of this global movement that has been going on since the late 1970s. 
Although  the tax reform plans of other countries differ greatly, they share a 
number of features with Japan’s. In particular, Japan’s movement seems to be 
inspired  by  a wider introduction of the value-added  tax  (VAT)  in countries 
such as Korea and to be accelerated by the achievement of the U.S. tax re- 
form, which lowered the income tax rates and broadened the tax base. 
More than ten years have passed, however, since the Japanese government 
took a first step toward tax reform. In 1979 Prime Minister Masayoshi Ohira 
proposed the plan that includes the VAT  and minor revisions of  tax prefer- 
ences. Expanding fiscal deficits were the initial motivation for the tax reform. 
From the first oil crisis in 1973 to the second in 1979, the Japanese economy 
experienced unprecedented  serious structural changes.  The sharp decline in 
the economic growth rate meant a drop in tax revenues,  and new social wel- 
fare programs and public investment to stimulate domestic demand drastically 
increased government spending. 
A quick inspection of table 3.1 indicates how much the government budget 
changed.  Up to 1974, the government had a budget surplus or at least a bal- 
anced budget.  But huge government deficits arose in  1975 from the first oil 
shock and accelerated due to the second one. As a result, the budget deficits 
at the general government level amounted to 4.4 percent of the GNP in 1979. 
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69 Table 3.1  Sectoral Saving-Investment  Balance as  Percentage of GNP,  1970-88 
1970  1971  1972  1973  1974  1975  1976  1977  1978  1979 
Public sector  -0.6  -2.3  -2.6  -0.5  -3.8  -7.5  -6.8  -7.3  -7.4  -7.1 
General government  1.8  0.5  0.2  2.0  0.0  -3.7  -3.6  -4.2  -4.2  -4.4 
Centralgovernment  0.0  -1.0  -1.1  0.4  -1.4  -4.0  -4.3  -5.0  -4.8  -5.7 
Localgovernment  -0.4  -1.0  -1.1  -1.0  -1.3  -2.1  -1.6  -1.8  -1.7  -1.4 
Social securityfund  2.2  2.5  2.4  2.6  2.6  2.4  2.3  2.7  2.4  2.6 
Public enterprise  -2.4  -2.8  -2.8  -2.5  -3.7  -3.8  -3.2  -3.2  -3.2  -2.7 
Private enterprise  -5.5  -4.7  -5.1  -9.4  -8.2  -4.7  -3.4  -1.5  0.1  -2.5 
Household  7.9  8.8  10.1  10.6  11.6  11.5  10.9  10.4  8.7  7.6 
Domestic  1.8  1.8  2.3  0.7  -0.4  -0.8  0.7  1.6  1.4  -2.0 
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Since then, there has been growing concern with how to eliminate government 
budget deficits. 
Unfortunately, strong opposition has emerged to the introduction of the Jap- 
anese type of VAT,  the “general consumption tax,” which is a tax credit type 
of  VAT  without invoices. The ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) lost 
many seats in the lower house in the  1979 general election, mainly due to 
public resistance to this general consumption tax. This election forced the 
government to give up plans for the general consumption tax and to change to 
a strategy of curtailing budget deficits. The only measure that remained was 
the spending-cut policy. 
The government rushed on a campaign for “fiscal reconstruction,” which 
aimed  to  reduce  budget  deficits  by  cutting  government  expenditures.  It 
adopted the so-called ceiling method, imposing guidelines on the preliminary 
budget requests from each ministry. This spending cut policy beginning in 
1980 was highly successful in that nonentitled central government expendi- 
ture remained constant from fiscal 1983 to fiscal 1986. There were two major 
reasons for this success. One was the reform of  social welfare systems such 
as health insurance in 1984 and social security in 1985. Another was the sharp 
decline in public investment, which decreased from over  10 percent to 6.5 
percent of the GNP. 
It should be emphasized that revenues also contributed to the reduction in 
the budget deficits. The government left the individual income tax untouched 
except for minor changes after failing to introduce the general consumption 
tax. This led to automatic increases in income tax burdens, owing to bracket 
creep from income increases and inflation. Moreover, the corporate income 
tax rates were raised. For example, in 1984, the basic rate was raised from 42 
to 43.3 percent as a temporary measure. 
Dramatic recovery from budget deficits started in fiscal  1984. Table  3.1 
shows that the budget deficit on the general government level became 0.8 
percent of the GNP in 1985, which was better by  3.6 percent than the deficit 
in 1979. Behind this recovery lay growing criticism of the existing tax system, 
and the problem of tax reform had become the most important political issue. 
The process of tax reform started in September 1985, when Prime Minister 
Yasuhiro Nakasone appointed the tax advisory commission to review the cur- 
rent tax system and make suggestions for a new one adapted to the challenges 
of  the twenty-first century. Nakasone announced a number of  fine-sounding 
goals, which loosely translated are “equity, fairness, simplicity, freedom of 
choice, and economic vitality.” 
3.2  Increased Demand for Tax Reform 
Before describing the Nakasone tax reform proposals, I shall analyze why 
Japan needed the tax reform. The structure of the current tax system was orig- 
inally based on the recommendations of the Shoup mission in 1949. Although 72  Masaaki Homma 
the tax system has been revised occasionally, it has failed to keep up with the 
big changes in Japanese society and its economy. The tax system and the econ- 
omy have been badly matched, especially for the last fifteen years. 
From  1975 to  1984, the tax  burden rose  sharply in Japan. Measured in 
terms of national income, central government taxes were up 4.1 percent and 
local taxes 2.7 percent. This sort of increase has not been observed in other 
countries, and both families and businesses feel more heavily and unfairly 
taxed. 
Common dissatisfactions with the present tax system are summarized here. 
Tar Burden Diferences  among  Tapayers. There have been  serious com- 
plaints about horizontal inequality in Japan, with big differences in tax burden 
among  salaried workers,  the self-employed, farmers,  and  politicians. The 
popular “10:5:3:  1” formulation indicates that labor income of salaried work- 
ers is reported in full to the tax authority, while the self-employed can declare 
only 50 percent of what they earn, farmers 30 percent, and politicians a mere 
10 percent. 
Differences in tax burden arise partly because the tax collection system for 
salaried workers is fundamentally different from that for other taxpayers. The 
former have their taxes withheld by  their employers, while the latter pay on 
the basis of the income they declare in their tax returns. In addition, the self- 
employed and others filing under the self-assessment system enjoy a far wider 
variety of  tax breaks. The special treatment of unincorporated businesses as 
quasi-corporations, that is, deemed corporations, is a typical example. This 
tax preference allows them to deduct all business expenses from taxable earn- 
ings and to reclassify much of these earnings as salary payments to themselves 
and family members. And  by  making use of  the standard deduction for all 
salaried workers, they further reduce their tax bill. 
Differences in the tax collection system and several measures favoring the 
self-employed and farmers are major causes of the horizontal inequities in the 
personal income tax. Equity requires elimination of  such preferential treat- 
ments. 
Mismatch between the Wage System and income Tar Structures. National and 
local income taxes paid by  salaried workers rose from 8.3 percent of  their 
wage earnings in 1970 to 10.6 percent in 1984. This rise has widened a mis- 
match between the wage system and the individual income tax. Wages in Ja- 
pan tend to be strongly determined by  seniority, and the wage profile rises by 
age.  Yet  Japan’s  income taxes  are  extremely progressive, placing  a  pro- 
nounced emphasis on the redistribution of  income. Between 1970 and 1984, 
national tax rates ranged from  10.5 to 70 percent in  fifteen brackets, local 
taxes from 4.5 to 18 percent in fourteen brackets. 
Such steep graduation does not exist in other countries. Extraordinary pro- 
gressiveness results in marked unevenness in the distribution of the tax burden 73  Tax  Reform in Japan 
among age groups in a society where wages rise with seniority. As workers 
grow older and earn more money, their tax rates go up steeply, subjecting them 
to a form of bracket creep. 
Figure 3.1 shows the individual income tax burdens at different life stages 
for the average salaried worker born in  1953. Middle-class or middle-age sal- 
aried workers, particularly in their forties and fifties, who are spending a lot 
for their children’s education or for a residence always feel that their tax bur- 
den is too heavy. From this point of view, reduction in the progressiveness of 
the income tax, especially for middle-class salaried workers, has become one 
of the most important subjects in the tax reform. 
Unfairness in Taxation on Capital Income. Tax reform is also aimed at unfair 
taxation on capital income. Interest income is exempt from income taxation, 
up to a certain total face value of  personal savings. This tax preference is 
called the “Maruyu system.” Moreover, capital gains from selling stock are 
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These special tax measures were initiated to stimulate personal savings and 
to promote economic growth through capital accumulation. In fact, Japan’s 
high saving rate may have been one of the major factors contributing to the 
country’s rapid growth in the past. But the situation has changed greatly. Pref- 
erential tax treatment of  personal savings has given rise to especially sharp 
complaints, not only internally but overseas, as being a source of inequitable 
tax systems and a factor behind the massive current account surplus. Revising 
the taxation of  income from capital, both to achieve vertical equity and to 
bring it into line with international standards, is an indispensable part of  tax 
reform. 
Complaints about Heavy Corporate Tax Burden. Businessmen often unfavor- 
ably compare Japan’s corporate income tax to that of other countries. Corpo- 
rate tax rates have  risen several times since 1970, mainly to finance budget 
deficits. According to Ministry of  Finance (MOF) calculations, the effective 
corporate tax rate, measuring the combined burden of national and local taxes, 
was 52.92 percent in 1984. This rate is extraordinarily high compared to the 
United  States.  As  figure  3.2 shows, the marginal  U.S. corporate tax  rate 
dropped sharply from 51.55 to 40.34 percent, based on the MOF formula, as 
a result of  Ronald Reagan’s tax reform. It has been emphasized in Japan that 
active corporations might move their place of business to countries where tax 
burdens are lower, and such a reaction could damage Japanese competitive- 
ness at the international level. 
Numerous tax preferences in the corporate income tax, mainly to encourage 
export and business saving and investment, and a differential rate have added 
to the complexity of the corporate income tax in Japan. The main objective of 
corporate income tax reform has been to reduce the tax burden by  lowering 
tax rates and broadening the tax base. 
Outdatedness of  Indirect Taxes. The outdatedness of Japan’s indirect taxes is 
another problem,  because of  diversification  of  consumer spending. From 
1970 to 1984, the ratio of  indirect tax revenue to final consumer spending 
shrank from 8.8  percent to 7.7 percent, not because the existing indirect taxes 
on special categories of consumption had been lowered. On the contrary, the 
rates had been raised repeatedly, but the tax base was limited to a small num- 
ber of  selected items. Most revenue from excise taxes was collected on pur- 
chases of automobiles and home appliances. Many luxuries have never been 
drawn into the tax base.  Services, meanwhile, remained virtually untaxed, 
even though they accounted for about half  of  consumption. The failure to 
update the indirect tax system so as to reflect changing consumption patterns 
was one of the major reasons indirect taxes had declined in importance rela- 
tive to direct taxes. A fundamental revision of  the indirect tax system is a 
matter of urgent necessity. 76  Masaaki Hornrna 
3.3  The Nakasone Tax Reform 
Motivated by increased taxpayers’ demand for tax reform and inspired by 
the accomplishment  of Reagan’s tax reform, Prime Minister Yasuhiro Naka- 
sone took a second step toward tax reform. At his request, the tax advisory 
commission  submitted “The Report on the Overall Review of  the Tax Sys- 
tem,” which constructed a tax reform plan in October 1986. According to the 
report, the Nakasone administration  proposed a fiscal year  1987 tax reform 





Reduction  of the income tax burden, especially for middle-income  sala- 
ried workers, mainly through simplification of the tax rates structure and 
introduction of the special deduction for a spouse. 
Reduction of the basic tax rate on corporate income to less than 50 percent 
from the current 52.9 percent, measured in terms of the MOF’s effective 
tax rate. 
Abolition of  tax exemption on interest income for small savers through 
the adoption of a 20 percent withholding tax. 
Introduction of the sales tax, which is a variant of the European Commu- 
nity (EC) VAT,  in place of the current excise taxes. 
Table 3.2 summarizes the reform package of tax increases and reductions. 
The characteristic feature is that the package was proposed to satisfy “revenue 
neutrality”  in  its  first  year.  The concept  of  revenue  neutrality  in  Japan  is 
slightly different  from that  in  the United  States. The U.S. tax  reform was 
designed to be revenue-neutral in the succeeding five years. It should be noted 
that this mixed reform package results in a shift in the tax mix toward indirect 
taxes. 
As  stated  above, the basic  structure  of  the Nakasone  tax  reform  would 
lower the individual and corporate income tax rates by bringing into the tax 
base income and consumption sources previously excluded, i.e., repeal of the 
tax exemption for interest income and adoption of a broad-based consumption 
tax. Thus the Nakasone tax reform avoided the elimination of preferential tax 
treatment in the individual and corporate income tax, which was strongly re- 
sisted by special groups of taxpayers.  Instead, it was emphasized that the in- 
troduction of a broad-based  consumption tax, the sales tax, could contribute 
Table 3.2  Tax Bill Proposed in 1987 (in billions of yen) 
Tax Reductions  Tax Increases 
Individual income tax  27,000  Introduction of the sales tax  35,000 
Corporate income tax  18,000  Repeal of  tax exemption for  10,Ooo 
Total  45,000  Total  45 ,Ooo 
small savers 
Source: Ministry of  Finance, Monrhly Report of  Fiscal and Financial Sraristics, Special Issue on 
m.  1988. 77  Tax Reform in Japan 
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to horizontal equity because the tax burden would be  spread evenly among 
consumers,  irrespective  of  whether  they  are  salaried  workers  or  self- 
employed. 
Strong opposition to this proposal emerged immediately, for three major 
reasons. The first was Nakasone’s political mistake. During the campaign for 
the general election in July 1986, he pledged not to introduce a “large-scale” 
indirect tax. After a landslide victory for the LDP, the tax proposal introduced 
a large-scale indirect tax, “the sales tax.” The general public accused Naka- 
sone of dishonesty. 
The second reason was the regressiveness of the package of individual tax 
reductions and indirect tax increases: the reform was favorable to high-income 
people rather than to middle- or low-income people. Figure 3.3 shows that 
those who earned more than  Y6  million annually would benefit from the tax 
reform, those who earned less would lose.’ The majority of  taxpayers felt 
betrayed and did not support Nakasone’s tax reform. 
The third source of  opposition was small businesses in the wholesale and 
1.  See my estimate (1986) for a detailed analysis. 78  Masaaki Homma 
retail trade.  Small traders feared that they could not pass the sales tax on at 
each stage of transactions and would have to bear the tax burden, and that the 
sales tax with invoices would force them to reveal all their transactions to the 
tax  authority  and make it impossible to  avoid  income tax as they had been 
doing. 
The proposal failed to get approval, and the government was forced to with- 
draw the bill in May 1987. The Nakasone administration gave up introducing 
sales taxes and submitted a revised bill to the Diet. The revised bill that was 
passed in September 1987 was the final product of Nakasone's tax reform. 
Let me summarize briefly Nakasone's achievement before proceeding to the 
next stage of tax reform. 
Simplzj'ication of  Tax Rate Structure.  Simplification  of  the  progressive  tax 
rates is much more modest than in the original pIan. The original proposal of 
10-50  percent in only six income brackets was revised to 10.5-60 percent in 
twelve brackets. The range of taxable income to which the minimum rate ap- 
plies  was  widened, so that  about  two-thirds  of  salaried  workers  would  be 
taxed at the minimum. The maximum rate was lowered from 70 percent to 60 
percent. See table 3.3. 
Introduction  of Special  Exemption for Spouse. As explained  earlier,  a self- 
employed person is permitted to reduce individual tax by sharing income with 
a spouse and other family members under special preferences of deemed cor- 
Table 3.3  Statutory Rates of Income Taxes 
1986  1987 
Taxable Income  Tax  Rates  Taxable Income  Tax Rates 
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porations. Salaried workers who have no way to split income complain about 
this preferential treatment, which results in  a big tax gap between salaried 
workers and the self-employed. To  lessen this gap, a special exemption of 
Y 165,000 for spouses of salaried workers is deductable from total income in 
addition to the ordinary deduction of  Y 300,000 
Revision of  Tau Exemption for Small  Savers. As explained earlier, interest 
income was tax exempt for small savers. This exemption had been abused 
extensively by rich people because Japan had no adequate enforcement of the 
limitation on the maximum amount of saving eligible. Since the revision, in- 
terest income is taxed in principle by a withholding tax at the uniform rate of 
20 percent except for the elderly, fatherless families, and handicapped people. 
Minor Reduction of  Corporate Tau Rates. The corporate income tax had two 
split rates, one for retained income (43.3 percent), another for dividends (33.3 
percent). In each tax rate,  1.3 percent was temporarily surcharged to help 
“fiscal reconstruction.” This surcharge was abolished by  the bill, and the ef- 
fective corporate tax rate dropped from 52.92 to 51.56 percent in terms of 
MOF’s effective tax rate. See figure 3.2. 
3.4  The Takeshita Tax Reform 
The Nakasone tax reform ended in September 1987 after he achieved only 
half of his original plan. But his main ideas of tax reform were adopted by the 
next cabinet. Nakasone appointed Noboru Takeshita as his successor, asking 
him to go forward with the tax reform. 
When the Takeshita administration relaunched the tax reform in November 
1987, great changes were visible in the Japanese economy. Stable and strong 
economic growth resulted in large tax revenue increases in 1987 and the fol- 
lowing years. Thus budget deficits disappeared, and in fact a huge budget 
surplus at the general government level appeared for the central government, 
local government, and social security account (see table 3.1). 
Taking these changes into consideration, the Takeshita administration aban- 
doned the “revenue-neutral” tax reform approach and offered in  1988 a new 
tax plan that contained a  Y24,000 billion net  tax reduction (see table 3.4). 
This tax reduction was more attractive to taxpayers and to other countries, for 
it could increase the domestic market. 
Moreover, asset prices such as land and stock soared. This stressed the un- 
fair distribution of asset holdings among the rich and the poor, and revealed 
that the present tax preferences for income derived from selling land and stock 
were very inequitable. In addition to the remaining reforms suggested by Na- 
kasone, i.e., introduction of  broad-based indirect tax, the Takeshita tax re- 
form plan had to include a new taxation system for capital gains on the sale of 
stocks. 80  Masaaki Homma 
Table 3.4  Tax Bill Proposed in 1988 (in billions of yen) 
Tax Reductions  Tax Increases 
Individual income tax  3,100  Introduction of  2,000 
consumption tax (5,400) 
minus repeal of selective 
excise tax (3,400) 
Corporate income tax  600 
Inheritance tax  700 
Total  4,400  Total  2,000 
Net reduction 2,400 
Source: Ministry of Finance, Month1.y Report of Fiscal and Financial Statistics, Special Issue on 
Tax, 1989. 
The four basic features of  the tax reform sent to the Diet in July  1988 by 
the Takeshita administration are summarized here. 
Further Reductions of  the National Individual Income Tax and the Local In- 
habitants’ Tax. The number of income tax brackets was reduced from fifteen 
to twelve by the Nakasone tax reform. A flatter tax schedule is proposed  by 
the Takeshita tax reform (see fig. 3.4), ranging from 10 to 50 percent in five 
income brackets.  Also, the progressiveness of the local inhabitants’ tax has 
been reduced to 5-15  percent with three income brackets. 
The personal exemption for spouses and the exemption for dependants si- 
multaneously rose from  Y 300,000 ( Y  280,000 for local inhabitants’ tax) to 
Y 330,000 ( Y 300,000). And two additional measures are expanded or intro- 
duced in favor of  specific taxpayers.  The special exemption for spouses in 
one-earner couples was introduced at Y  100,000 (U50,OOO). 
Further Cut and  Un$ication in Corporate Tax Rates.  The basic rate for re- 
tained  income levied on ordinary corporations gradually  decreased from 42 
percent to 37.5 percent after fiscal 1990, while the reduced rate for dividends 
rose from 32 percent to 37.5 percent. The two split tax rates are now a single 
tax rate, simplifying the present corporate income tax. A similar modification 
applies to tax rates on small and medium-size corporations; the basic rate de- 
creased from 30 to 28 percent,  and the reduced rate rose from 24 to 28 per- 
cent. 
Introduction of  the Consumption Tax. The most important issue in the Take- 
shita tax reform was the new consumption tax, which is a special variant of 
VAT.  The sales tax proposed  by  the Nakasone tax reform was the invoice- 
credit method, as used in the EC, but this was clearly rejected by the public. 
Learning from this experience, the government adopted a VAT  that uses no 
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The consumption tax without invoices depends on the subtraction method 
of the VAT,  which uses bookkeeping to calculate a firm's VAT.  In this sense, 
it is called the account type of VAT.  Subtracting total taxable purchases from 
total taxable sales gives the taxable value added, subject to a 3 percent VAT. 
The account type of VAT is useful mainly because it mitigates opposition 
to the new tax  from groups in retail or wholesale businesses.  It has several 
problems, however. First, tracing the transactions from one stage to another is' 
impossible-a  strong incentive for cheating, because accurate assessment of 
the tax base is very difficult for the tax authority. 
Second, the account type of  VAT  cannot make clear distinctions  among 
fully taxed, tax-reduced,  and tax-exempt goods and services. This is why the 
consumption  tax covers only a few tax-exempt goods and services,  such as 
some education, medical care, and welfare programs, and abandons multiple 
tax rates. The broad tax base and single tax rate save compliance costs but 
appropriately cope with the distributional problem. 
Moreover, the consumption tax has a special simplified rule for computing 
tax that favors smaller firms whose annual sales are less than Y500  million. 
This special rule assumes that the total value of  purchases from other firms is 
80 percent of  total sales value for retailers (90 percent for wholesalers). This 82  Masaaki Homma 
implies that the value added is 20 percent of total sales, and therefore tax is 
automatically equal to the total sales value multiplied by 0.6 percent (0.20 of 
the 3 percent rate). Completely exempt are firms whose annual sales are less 
than Y  30 million, 68 percent of the total number of  firms in 1986. 
Timation on Capital Gains from Selling  Stocks. Capital gains on the sale of 
stocks were to be taxed under the Shoup tax proposals in 1950. But the gov- 
ernment decided not to tax these capital gains, partly because they could stim- 
ulate domestic savings and promote economic growth and partly because ef- 
fective enforcement of the tax was very difficult. Since then, capital gains had 
in principle been tax-exempt except for people who continuously dealt with 
stocks in large volumes. 
Reflecting a sharp rise in stock prices, untaxed capital gains on the sale of 
stocks had been seriously attacked as a symbol of unfairness. In response the 
Takeshita administration proposed that taxpayers could choose at each trans- 
action  between  two tax methods.  One was the self-assessed  declaration,  in 
which realized capital gains would be taxed separately from other income at 
26 percent  including  local  tax.  The second was withholding,  in  which  the 
taxpayers would have to pay  1 percent of the stock sales price, assuming that 
the capital gain at each transaction is 5 percent of the stock sales prices. 
3.5  Effects of the Reform on Households 
When  a country’s tax  system is thoroughly  overhauled,  all taxpayers are 
affected in one way or another. The Japanese reform, designed to reduce taxes 
overall, seems basically  sound in its thrust. The new consumption tax has a 
broad revenue-enhancing  effect.  National and local income taxes are being 
reduced, mainly through a flatter rate schedule that lowers the maximum rate 
and raises the minimum amount of income subject to taxation.  Other note- 
worthy changes  include a large hike in the  special exemption for spouses, 
which  applies only  to one-earner  couples, and an enhanced exemption  for 
certain dependents aged 16-22. 
One basic effect of the reform will be a redistribution of the tax burden on 
each category of household.  Compare, for instance,  two-earner couples,  in 
which both spouses work, with one-earner couples. Before the reform a two- 
earner couple usually paid  substantially less taxes than  a one-earner couple 
with the same amount of income, providing an incentive for both spouses to 
hold jobs. The flattening of the tax schedule reduces this difference, as does 
the  larger  exemption  for  a  spouse,  which  cannot  be  used  by  two-earner 
couples. Introducing a consumption tax will have a similar effect, since it will 
raise the prices of  the domestic services that two-earner couples often hire and 
the value of those that one-earner couples provide within the home. 
Couples living on pensions should see a rise in their tax burden. They will 
not benefit from the cut in income taxes, and they will be paying more con- 83  Tax Reform in Japan 
sumption taxes.  Neither will the reduction  in income taxes help unmarried 
taxpayers much, unless they happen to earn a lot of money: they generally are 
big consumers, and the exemption for spouses does not apply. 
I have conducted a series of simulations to clarify these and other effects of 
the tax reform on different household categories. Below I summarize the main 
findings. 
For our study, we used the five-category breakdown of households shown 
in figure 3.5, drawing on a nationwide survey of consumption. Slightly more 
than  half  all  Japanese  households  are  in  the  one-earner  couple  or single- 
income category.  Less than one-tenth are one-member  households-mostly 
younger  men  or  women  living  independently.  Senior  citizens  above  the 
pension-entitlement age account for a small fraction of  the total. About half 
of these “old-aged couples,” as we label this category, have some employment 
income; the rest depend almost entirely on pensions. All other households are 
those in which both husband and wife work. 
I have broken this last group into two categories, each of  which accounts 
for about one-sixth of all households.  In the “single plus part-time income” 
category, usually the husband is a full-time worker and the wife supplements 
the  family  income  with  part-time  employment,  bringing  in  less  than 
One member  7.5 
Old-aged 
couple 3.6 
Dual  income 
16.6 
Single plus 
part-  t i  me 
income 
Fig. 3.5  Categories of households (% of total households) 
Source: Calculations from Homma et al. (1988). 84  Masaaki Homma 
%9900,000 per  year,  the  threshold beyond  which  a  spouse  could  not  be 
claimed as a dependent before the reform. The other is the true two-earner 
couple or  dual-income category; it covers all families in which the second 
worker’s income exceeds Y  900.000. 
3.5.1 
Next let us consider the typical income profile of these five household cat- 
egories. On a scale extending from the vicinity of  Y2  million, the earnings of 
an entry-level employee or lower-class family, to V  10 million or  more for 
people in upper income brackets, the average family has an annual income of 
around Y4  million or  Y  5 million. 
As shown in figure 3.6, single-income households and younger people liv- 
ing alone account for the majority of  low-income families (Homma et al. 
1988). At incomes up to  Y2  million, almost 90 percent of all households fall 
in one of these two categories, and the rest are people living on pensions. On 
the upper end of the scale, 82 percent of the households earning Y  10 million 
or  more are single-income families, and almost all the rest are dual-income 
families. 
Households of young unmarried people and of old-aged couples are clus- 
tered in the lower income brackets; as income reaches the  Y6  million level, 
their percentage of all households diminishes to a tiny fraction. By contrast, 
few families with two earners, including the category where the spouse works 
part time, fall in the lowest income brackets. 
Looking more closely at the three categories of households in which both 
spouses are in their productive years, we can note differentials in their distri- 
bution. Thought the one-earner families are prominent in all income brackets, 
they are most highly represented in the relatively low Y 3 million- Y  4  million 
income range. Families in which the wife works part time are, as noted, infre- 
quent on the upper end. Their distribution rises sharply to a peak in the Y4 
million-Y5  million range and  declines almost  as  sharply.  The true dual- 
income couples naturally have a somewhat richer profile. Their distribution 
peaks in the  %5 million-Y7  million range and then declines gradually. A 
fairly large percentage of  the households in this category are in the upper 
income brackets. 
3.5.2  Divided Impact on the Middle Class 
Now we can proceed to an analysis of the Takeshita tax reform’s impact. As 
is customary in this sort of analysis, I assume that the “standard” family has 
two parents and two dependents. What we  are looking for is the change in 
total taxes after the new measures, except for the corporate income tax, are all 
in place compared with taxes in  1987, before the first measures went into 
effect. 
As noted, one change is a larger special exemption for spouses with no job, 
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which has been boosted from V 165,000 annually to Y350,OOO. This exemp- 
tion can be claimed by any one-earner family earning up to  Y 10 million a 
year. Another change is a small V 20,000 increase in the exemption for each 
dependent, to  Y 350,000,  together with a provision enabling families with 
children between  16 and 22, who have high education expenses, to claim a 
larger exemption of  Y450,000. These breaks should more than offset the bur- 
den of consumption tax for one-earner couples, reducing their total taxes. 
Figure 3.7 shows the effects of the reform on middle-class families. Look- 
ing first at one-earner couples, we can see that their taxes will decline substan- 
tially if they can claim the large exemption for an older child. Slightly smaller 
but still significant reductions result even when the enhanced exemption can- 
not be claimed. The biggest savings will be realized by families in the upper- 
middle class with incomes in the Y7 million-Y  10 million range, who should 
see a reduction in their taxes of  10 percent or more. For the lower-middle 
class, which might be defined as families earning between  V4 million and 
Y 6 million, the reduction in taxes is slightly lower. A one-earner family earn- 
ing  Y3 million will benefit only modestly; below that there could be an in- 
crease in taxes. Such observations provide clear evidence of the reformers’ 
intention of  slanting the benefits in the direction of  the middle and  upper 
classes. 
Still, even low-income families with one earner will not necessarily bear a 
heavier tax burden. As long as they have no children or only one, reducing 
their consumption and thus the burden of  consumption tax, I calculate that 
their taxes  should decline slightly even if  they are in  the  Y2 million-Y3 
million bracket. The biggest break is the much larger special exemption for 
spouses. Families with many children will pay more because of consumption 
tax; the comparatively small hikes in dependent exemptions will not cancel its 
effect. 
Families in which the wife works part time do not fare as well. They can 
claim the special exemption only if the second worker brings home Y570,OOO 
or less. Above that the deduction decreases. Those couples earning less than 
Y4  million each year will see a fairly large rise in their tax bills. As I have 
noted, however, many families in the single plus part-time income category 
earn more than Y4  million, and they should all see an average reduction in 
their taxes of about 5 percent. 
The worst off  will be the two-earner families who earn less than Y8  mil- 
lion. They will all have to pay more taxes because consumption tax will more 
than offset the relatively small cuts in national and local income taxes for their 
income brackets. Since only a minority of two-earner families earn more than 
Y 8 million, we can conclude that the reform is not designed to improve the 
situation of the average family in this category. 
Above I noted that families in which both spouses hold regular jobs have 
been favored in the tax system thus far. By reporting their income separately 


































































































































 88  Masaaki Homma 
these two-earner couples will now have a higher tax bill, at least relative to 
one-earner couples, the reform has moved their taxation closer to the average. 
One further point deserves attention.  Under  the old tax system the two- 
earner couples came out ahead of the one-earner couples only if their income 
amounted to  Y5 million  or more; below that,  their tax burden was slightly 
higher. Now the breakeven point comes in the vicinity of  Y6  million. Above 
that, the dual-income family will still pay somewhat less; below that, the size 
of its disadvantage will grow larger. Of all working couples, these are the ones 
that are hardest hit. 
3.5.3  The Plight of Pensioners 
How  will Japan’s young  singles and old-aged couples come out? I have 
calculated their taxes using average income statistics for their households. As 
noted earlier, 7.5 percent of all households are those of young people living 
alone, They divide evenly between  males  and  females,  but whereas single 
men earn Y  2.5 million in employment income on the average, single women 
earn only Y  1.9 million. The women are better at saving, earning Y68,000 in 
interest and dividends compared with Y  39,000 for the men. The women con- 
sume less than the men, but their consumption is a higher percentage of in- 
come because of their lower earnings. 
Before the reform, single men incurred total taxes amounting to Y  329,000 
on the average,  a level that comes to  13 percent  of their income. After the 
reform  their  burden  will  be  almost  unchanged,  moving  up  slightly  to 
Y341,OOO. Single women will be hit harder. Their prereform tax burden of 
Y216,OOO will climb by 9 percent to Y 235,000, elevating their ratio of taxes 
to income from 1  1 percent to 12 percent. 
Among the 3.6 percent of households receiving pensions, meanwhile, the 
reform’s impact will differ between those senior citizens who also have em- 
ployment income and those who do not. Old-aged  couples receiving money 
from both jobs and pensions have an average annual income of  Y4.5 million. 
Before the reform, their total tax bill, including payments for local and indi- 
rect taxes, came to Y257,OOO; after the reform it should drop by 7 percent to 
Y239,OOO.  This will slightly reduce their ratio of taxes to income from 5.7 
percent to 5.3 percent. 
One of  the  heaviest  increases  in  taxes  will  be  shouldered  by  old-aged 
couples who are almost entirely dependent on pensions, living on some Y2.5 
million  a year. Most of  the taxes they pay  are the various existing indirect 
taxes; the introduction of a consumption tax scheme will shift their payments 
from Y 118,000 to Y  139,000, a sharp rise of 18 percent. As a result, the tax- 
to-income ratio will climb from 4.7 percent to 5.5 percent. 
3.5.4  Adding up the Losers 
Having reviewed the tax changes in each household category, we are now 
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bear a heavier tax burden. Before proceeding, note that my  source for the 
distribution of  households in each income bracket is from 1984. Since there 
has been a rise in income levels since then, the estimates may be somewhat 
high. 
Virtually all one-earner couples will receive tax relief; those that may see 
an  increase in their payments are limited to families earning less than  Y3 
million. Even among these, there may still be a slight reduction in taxes de- 
pending  on  their  life-style.  The  families  in  the  Y2 million-Y3  million 
bracket with just one child may come out ahead. All in all, I calculate that 
one-earner couples that will be paying more taxes come to 8.4 percent of all 
Japanese households. 
For families with part-time income from spouses, taxes will increase only 
for the 4.5 percent of all households that have income of under YE4  million. 
Dual-income families in the Y  6  million- Y  8 million bracket will still be pay- 
ing less taxes than single-income families who earn less than  Y6 million. 
They account for 7.8 percent of all households. 
Among old-aged couples, the only beneficiaries are those who have em- 
ployment income and whose total annual income exceeds Y4  million. Since 
most senior citizens do not have that much income, we can add another 3.0 
percent share to the households that will be hurt by the tax reform. And the 
same can be said of the 7.5 percent share of single men and women, almost 
all of whom will be paying more taxes. 
Adding up these shares, we find that slightly over 30 percent of all Japanese 
households will see a modest to large increase in their taxes. Put another way, 
the great majority of households should benefit from the reform-or  at least 
not be seriously harmed by it. 
3.5.5  The Life-Stage Tax Burden 
The Takeshita reform package, switching from direct to indirect taxation, 
works well in terms of  the life-stage tax burden on households. As empha- 
sized in section 3.2, wages in Japan are strongly determined by  seniority, and 
the income tax rate structure of  has been extremely progressive. Under this 
situation, middle-age salaried workers in their forties and fifties have had a 
heavy tax burden (see fig. 3.1). 
As a result of  income tax cuts and an increased consumption tax, the tax 
burden is flattened and averaged over the whole life. Figure 3.8 confirms that 
this is the case. The combination of  income tax cuts and an increased con- 
sumption tax  will  shift the tax  burden  from the middle-aged stage to the 
younger or older-aged stage. 
3.6  Prospects for Further Reform 
I have briefly reviewed the process and contents of tax reform in Japan. 
Judged from the present achievements, the tax  reform unfortunately  is far 90  Masaaki Homma 
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Fig. 3.8  Life-stage tax burden (individual income tax, local inhabitants' tax, 
and consumption tax) 
Source: Hornrna et  al. (1988). 
from satisfactory and we still have  a lot of  work to improve the tax system. 
Here I shall note prospects for further reform. 
The standard procedure for tax reform is to reduce marginal tax rates by 
broadening the tax base. This is an indispensable step to attain consistent fair- 
ness, neutrality, and simplicity. But broadening the tax base is insufficient to 
substantially reduce individual income tax rates and corporate tax rates. 
One approach to broadening the tax base is to repeal special exemptions 
and deductions for particular groups of  taxpayers. Typical examples are the 
special treatment of the income that medical doctors receive from social insur- 
ance programs: the special treatment of unincorporated businesses as deemed 
corporations; and tax-free reserves, depreciation allowances, and tax credits 
in corporate tax. These preferences are untouched, except for the elimination 
of the deductability of corporations' interest payments on land purchases, be- 
cause the government fears strong political repercussions. In order to secure 
fair taxation, greater efforts must be made to eliminate these tax preferences. 
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were previously excluded. The current tax reform marks a great advance in 
taxation of capital income. More specifically, the abolition of the tax exemp- 
tion on interest income for small savers and the repeal of the exemption of 
capital gains on the sale of  stocks have been achieved. But small savers are 
not very happy about the adoption of  a separate withholding tax rate. It is 
often claimed that  the present taxation system on capital income must be 
changed into a comprehensive tax system. To  do so, we must introduce the 
tax identification number. This has been a most controversial issue in Japan, 
however, and has not been settled. 
The taxation of  land has been  heatedly discussed. As mentioned earlier, 
land prices have soared sharply since 1987, accompanied by  growing criti- 
cism against the present taxation system. The tax base of the real estate tax is 
extremely undervalued relative to current prices, and therefore the effective 
real estate tax rates are extraordinarily low. In addition, special treatments for 
agriculture have induced landholders not to sell their land and have been a 
major cause of high land prices. 
There has been great concern about the revision of  consumption tax intro- 
duced in the current tax reform. To obtain support from opposing groups in 
retail and wholesale, the consumption tax has several special measures that 
are likely to wipe out the possible merits of the usual VAT.  The most serious 
drawback is  the subtraction method,  which  uses  bookkeeping without in- 
voices. As explained earlier, there is a strong incentive for cheating, because 
the chain of transactions from one stage to another cannot be traced. More- 
over, the subtraction method is an imprecise way to deal with the export tax 
credit, compared to the usual type of VAT,  i.e., the invoice method. 
Special treatment of  small or medium-size traders should also be formu- 
lated by international standards. Some type of  exemption system frees small 
traders from the VAT  in every country. The consumption tax in Japan sets the 
exemption level of  Y  30 million in terms of annual sales, extraordinarily high 
compared to other countries. In addition, the special simplified procedures for 
measuring the tax base must be reconsidered, because they include too many 
taxpayers. Taxable traders with annual sales of  less than  Y.500  million can 
apply the simplified procedures, which use fixed percentages. This greatly 
impairs fairness and distorts economic activity. 
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Comment  Hiromitsu Ishi 
Masaaki  Homma has two objectives  in his  paper on recent  tax  reforms  in 
Japan: to trace the trends of previous tax reforms and to estimate the distribu- 
tional effects of the Takeshita tax reform. Both parts are interesting and stim- 
ulating and should be of great help to foreign observers. In particular, the first 
part of this paper is a well-drawn clarification of many issues in the tax re- 
forms attempted by the Japanese government over the past decade. 
The facts in this paper are limited to the distributional effects of tax reform. 
However, Homma does not clearly derive his policy implications from these 
facts. For instance, he demonstrates that slightly over 30 percent of  all Japa- 
nese households  will  see a modest  tax increase as a result of the Takeshita 
reform package. Does this imply a successful tax reform or not? Of course, it 
is a bit difficult to assess such a complicated reform package, but I’d like to 
hear Homma’s overall judgment of the sweeping tax reforms in Japan. 
Second, his argument is restricted to short-term effects of the tax reforms. 
However, sweeping tax reforms by the Nakasone and Takeshita governments 
have obvious links to the future performance of the Japanese economy, given 
Japan’s  aging  population. Consequently,  the  reform  package  should be as- 
sessed on its long-term policy effect. (Yukio Noguchi puts a positive value on 
Japan’s VAT over the long run [see chapter 91.) 
Third, it seems to me that Homma supports a heavier tax burden on capital 
income, such as interest and capital gains, but does not state his position on 
comprehensive  income tax. I  think it is crucial  to address taxing of  capital 
income in the controversy over income tax versus expenditure tax. 
Even though capital income has been taxed more heavily in recent tax re- 
forms, rates are different from those for other income. Homma does not say 
whether this tax change on capital income is justifiable. Theoretically, Japan’s 
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tax system is still midway between a comprehensive  income tax and an ex- 
penditure tax. 
To continue tax reform, which  direction, income tax  or expenditure tax, 
should we take in the future? In view of  capital income taxation,  should we 
maintain the current system, levy heavier taxes on capital income, or mitigate 
its tax burden until it is tax free? 
Comment  Charles E. McLure. Jr. 
My comments on Masaaki Homma’s paper fall into four general categories. 
They are as much comments on Japanese tax reform as on the paper. 
Defects of  the Subtraction VAT 
Japan has adopted a subtraction-method value-added tax at a time when the 
defects of such a tax are coming to be widely recognized.  Unlike the credit 
method, the  subtraction  method  involves calculating  and  taxing “slices” of 
value  added.  Thus  the  tax  rate  applied  at  each  stage  in  the  production- 
distribution process actually matters, contrary to the situation under the credit 
method.  Such a tax can operate effectively only if the tax base is comprehen- 
sive and there is only one rate. Multiple rates  create distortions  and make 
accurate border tax  adjustment  (taxation of  imports and tax rebates on ex- 
ports) impossible. In the recent Canadian debate this feature of the subtraction 
method was seen by some to be an asset: politicians would be constrained by 
the technical features of the tax to avoid legislating multiple rates and exemp- 
tions. My own view is that this is naive; legislators will do what they want, 
whether it makes sense or not. Japanese experience may suggest that those 
favoring the subtraction method in Canada were right, since there is only one 
rate in Japan. But one wonders whether the uniqueness of the rate will survive 
if additional revenues-and  higher rates-are  required. 
The provision of relief  for small business is also problematical under the 
subtraction method. Under the credit method an exemption actually increases 
tax liability, rather than decreasing it; as a result, no business with substantial 
purchases  of  taxed inputs that is capable of  compliance with the tax would 
voluntarily  choose  to  be  exempt.  By  comparison,  under  the  subtraction 
method, exemption lowers tax liability and is much to be desired. Depending 
on  eligibility  requirements for exemption, a  small business  exemption  can 
encourage fragmentation of business, resulting in inequities, economic distor- 
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tions, and loss of  revenue. The potential for mischief  is reduced in the Japa- 
nese  system by  an arbitrary  assumption  that  taxed purchases  constitute  80 
percent of sales. This approach, however, has another disadvantage.  It con- 
verts the VAT into a turnover tax for businesses that use this provision. 
Biting the Bullet 
One is struck by the Japanese government’s unwillingness to make politi- 
cally hard choices that  would  raise  taxes on certain  segments  of  society- 
primarily small business-by  introducing commonplace improvements in ad- 
ministrative techniques.  The invoice-based  credit-method  VAT  was rejected 
because taxpayers feared that the audit trail produced by the invoices would 
facilitate income tax administration. Japan still does not have a comprehensive 
taxpayer  identification  number.  Those in  business  are allowed  to pay  tax- 
deductible salaries to family members, without regard to whether or not ser- 
vices of  equal value are rendered  in exchange, a practice that is commonly 
outlawed  in  other countries. This kowtowing  to  small  business  stands in 
marked contrast to the increase in the taxation of  two-earner families.  One 
wonders whether the lack of  a capital gains tax on stock allows the tax on real 
estate gains to be circumvented by holding assets in corporate form. 
Finally, one also wonders why there has been such opposition to the rela- 
tively modest  3 percent VAT on the part of housewives.  Is it a “foot in the 
door” phenomenon: the fear that the rate will not remain at 3 percent for long? 
Are housewives simply fronting for neighborhood merchants who scare them 
with rumors of tax increases? 
Reducing Saving Incentives 
Japan, by introducing taxation of interest income, like other countries, has 
tilted from the consumption tax end of  the income-consumption spectrum to- 
ward the income tax end. This leads me to make a short comment that may be 
more relevant for other papers given at this conference than for Homma’s pa- 
per on Japan. 
Economic theory tells us that under certain idealized circumstances, expen- 
sing of  investment leads to a zero marginal effective tax rate on the income 
from equity investment.  If investment is debt financed, an interest deduction 
creates a negative marginal effective tax rate at the firm level. This may, how- 
ever, be compensated if interest income is taxed,  though such compensation 
is sometimes only partial because of differences in tax rates paid by borrowers 
and lenders.  If interest income is exempt, however,  the combined marginal 
effective tax rate paid by firms and their creditors is negative. Even if depre- 
ciation allowance (together with whatever investment allowances exist) is less 
generous than expensing, it is still quite possible to have a negative marginal 
effective tax rate if interest is exempt or only partially taxed. 
This line of reasoning raises interesting questions for the countries repre- 95  Tax Reform in Japan 
sented at this conference. What is the resource allocation effect of  a tax policy 
that implies negative marginal effective tax rates? It is quite common to have 
theoretical results favoring the exemption of  income from capital. It is less 
common, though not unknown, to have theoretical justifications  for negative 
marginal effective tax rates. 